Regional and Industry Lobbying in the Russian Federation at the Beginning of Economic Transformation (1991–1992)

The aim of this study is to assess the role of lobbying activities in relation to the government at the initial stage of Russian economic transformation. A literature review revealed the absence of a scientific consensus on the concept of “lobbying” and the limited capacity of current legal frameworks to clearly distinguish it from corruption. The ambiguity of the research subject necessitated the use of the inductive method, involving the examination of specific lobbying practices followed by the generalization of findings. The study’s source base identified three models of lobbying: territorial-industrial, sectoral, and individual. The results indicate that each model exhibits a specific combination of actors, interests, methods of promotion, and factors influencing effectiveness. Key characteristics of the established lobbying practices included weak institutional frameworks, the dominance of “political capital” over economic capabilities, and the prevailing role of personal influence. As a result, governmental concessions often contradicted the reform strategies in both the short and long term. The anti-crisis component of economic policy required the concentration of financial and material resources. However, granting preferences to resource-rich and industrially developed regions, as well as monopolistic enterprises, undermined the government’s capabilities while exacerbating the situation of vulnerable economic actors and population groups. The reform-oriented component aimed to establish a competitive market economy. Yet, the severe consequences of the Soviet economic model’s collapse and shock therapy created unfavourable conditions for economic activity. Lobbying capabilities became a survival factor in these realities, but the vast majority of economic actors lacked such opportunities. In the long term, this led to increased market monopolization and distortion of the competitive environment. Lobbying within government structures represented a societal adaptation to the changes occurring in the country. However, it simultaneously deformed economic policy, complicating the achievement of its objectives.

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