Evolution of the “Revolving Door” Mechanism in the Context of Interactions Between Business Interest Groups and the State in Russia in the 1990s – 2000s

The research is devoted to the issue of the “revolving door” mechanism evolution in the framework of interaction of business interest groups with the state in Russia in the 1990s – 2000s. The relevance of the chosen topic is defined by the need to study the empirical experience, which determined the logic of constructing a modern system of the “revolving door” mechanism in the Russian Federation, taking into account the assessment of its functioning in the 1990s – early 2000s. The methodology of the work is formed by combining elements of the problem-chronological, historical-comparative and historical-systemic methods, as well as the method of synchronous analysis. The aim of the study is to assess the main directions and factors of transformation of the “revolving door” mechanism in Russia in the period under review. As a result, it is concluded that the process of the “revolving door” mechanism transformation in the 1990s – 2000s was determined primarily by the dynamics of development of two factors — formation of a network of interest groups of large businesses and institutionalization of their interaction with the state. The absence of a consensus “constitution” for the interaction of interest groups, the generally low degree of institutionalization of this process, the highly competitive nature of the environment for the interaction of interest groups and the resource weakening of the public authority system contributed to the emergence of a situation in which the “revolving door” mechanism was actually transformed into a means of infiltrating government agencies with agents of influence of business interest groups and ensuring the loyalty of a part of the top bureaucracy to large commercial structures. In the early 2000s, the network interaction between the state and large business structures began to be built on the basis of the principle of equidistance between the owners of flagship economic companies and the centers of political decision-making. At the same time, the quality of institutionalization of the process of interaction between commercial structures and public authorities increased. The state continued to support leading interest groups, but assistance was provided on the condition that large businesses refused to try to directly or indirectly establish control over the functioning of federal-level authorities and the active involvement of interest groups in solving problems at the national level. The result of this was the normalization of the functioning of the “revolving door” mechanism.

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