Evolution of Interaction Mechanisms between the USSR and the BSSR to Eliminate Consequences of the Chernobyl Disaster

The article examines the problem of communication between the Belorussian SSR (BSSR) and the Union center on the issue of eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster in the dynamically changing political conditions of Perestroika. The Chernobyl disaster had a strong impact on the economic and political state of the country and society, as well as on the system of public administration and relations between the union center and the leadership of the BSSR. The process of these changes can be divided into three stages: 1986, in which the Union center played a key role in making decisions to eliminate the consequences of the disaster; 1987-1988, when the first prerequisites for a greater role of the republic in this matter began to take shape, and 1989-1991, when the republic tried to implement its supply standards in the union departments. At the first stage, the Union Government Commission and the Operational Group of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU were the determining force in the liquidation of the accident, supplying the necessary funds and materials to the affected regions, mobilizing the resources of the USSR. In the second stage, against the background of the democratization of socio-political relations, the BSSR began to formulate requests in excess of allied supplies. Finally, at the third stage, the BSSR created a program to eliminate the consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which covered a wide range of needs in the affected territories and required new capital investments. Initially, in 1989, the initiative in relations with the union center was in the hands of the republic, but under the influence of republican programs, the center formulated its own program to eliminate the consequences of the disaster, which was guided by the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. As a result, it is concluded that despite the initial supply of everything necessary to the BSSR and the change in the relationship between the center and the leadership of the BSSR, by the early 90s, political instability in the Soviet Union did not allow the union center to fully implement its obligations.

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