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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">gosupr</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Государственное управление. Электронный вестник</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Public Administration. E-journal (Russia)</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2070-1381</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Факультет государственного управления МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.55959/MSU2070-1381-117-2026-101-112</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">gosupr-335</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ПРОБЛЕМЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ: ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS: THEORY AND PRACTICE</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Сильное государство для слабого рынка: структурно-функциональный анализ финансово-экономического блока российского правительства накануне радикальной рыночной реформы (октябрь–декабрь 1991 г.)</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>A Strong State for a Weak Market: A Structural and Functional Analysis of the Financial and Economic Bloc of the Russian Government on the Eve of Market Reforms   (October–December 1991)</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0009-0007-3134-8869</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Логвенков</surname><given-names>И. С.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Logvenkov</surname><given-names>I. S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Логвенков Илья Сергеевич, Кандидат исторических наук</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Ilya S. Logvenkov, PhD</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">ilya.logvenkov@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>НИУ «МЭИ»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>National Research University “Moscow Power Engineering Institute”</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>02</day><month>09</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>1</volume><issue>117</issue><fpage>101</fpage><lpage>112</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Логвенков И.С., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Логвенков И.С.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Logvenkov I.S.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.spajournal.ru/jour/article/view/335">https://www.spajournal.ru/jour/article/view/335</self-uri><abstract><p>Цель настоящего исследования — выявить динамику роли государства в регулировании экономических процессов через призму структуры и функций российского правительства в преддверии радикальной рыночной реформы. Обзор научной литературы продемонстрировал отсутствие консенсуса в оценке востребованности государственного вмешательства в экономическую жизнь. Историография проблемы также показала, что существующие работы не позволяют сформировать точное и целостное описание структуры и функций финансово-экономического блока правительства, а значит, и провести качественный анализ его деятельности в изучаемый период. Источниковую базу исследования составили прежде всего нормативные и делопроизводственные документы органов государственной власти и материалы СМИ. Работа проведена на основе структурно-функционального подхода, предполагающего рассмотрение финансово-экономического блока правительства как целостного механизма, каждый элемент которого призван реализовывать специфические функции для достижения общей цели. Объектом анализа стал набор правительственных органов, напрямую участвовавших в оперативном управлении экономическими процессами: Министерство экономики и финансов РСФСР, Министерство торговли и материальных ресурсов РСФСР, Министерство промышленности РСФСР, Комитет внешнеэкономических связей РСФСР и Валютно-экономический совет РСФСР. В результате выявлены основные факторы структурно-функциональной эволюции финансово-экономического блока правительства: поглощение союзных министерств и госкомитетов, концентрация рычагов управления в руках узкой группы идеологически близких специалистов и отсутствие нормативноправовой базы подчинения элементов союзной системы государственного управления. Реализация указанными органами управления своих функций сопровождалась проблемами установления контроля над крупным центральным аппаратом, дефицитом финансовых и материально-технических ресурсов, а также перестройкой механизмов управления в условиях частичной либерализации экономики. Эти факторы актуализировали тенденции к укрупнению подконтрольных реформаторам правительственных структур и концентрации в них регулирующих функций. Несмотря на то, что правительство стремилось снизить роль директивных подходов к управлению, его способность в условиях экономического кризиса распределять наиболее дефицитные ресурсы предопределила сохранение высокого уровня государственного вмешательства в экономические процессы. </p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The study aims to identify changes in the role of the state in regulating economic processes through the lens of the structure and functions of the Russian government on the eve of radical market reform. A review of the scholarly literature revealed a lack of consensus regarding the desirability of state intervention in economic life. The historiography of the issue likewise shows that existing studies do not provide an accurate and integrated description of the structure and functions of the government’s financial and economic bloc, and therefore do not allow for a proper analysis of its activities during the period under consideration. The study is based primarily on normative and administrative documents of state authorities, as well as media materials. It is conducted within a structural-functional framework that views the government’s financial and economic bloc as an integrated mechanism, each component of which is designed to perform specific functions in order to achieve a common objective. The object of analysis was the set of government bodies directly involved in the operational management of economic processes: the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the RSFSR, the Ministry of Trade and Material Resources of the RSFSR, the Ministry of Industry of the RSFSR, the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the RSFSR, and the Currency and Economic Council of the RSFSR. This made it possible to identify the main factors driving the structural and functional evolution of the government’s financial and economic bloc. These included the absorption of union-level ministries and state committees, the concentration of executive levers in the hands of a narrow group of ideologically aligned specialists, and the absence of a legal and regulatory framework for subordinating the elements of the union system of state administration. The performance of these administrative bodies was accompanied by difficulties in establishing control over a large central apparatus, a shortage of financial and material-technical resources, and the restructuring of administrative mechanisms under conditions of partial economic liberalization. These factors brought to the fore the tendency toward the enlargement of government structures under the control of reformers and the concentration of regulatory functions within them. Although the government sought to reduce the role of directive methods of administration, its ability, under conditions of economic crisis, to allocate the scarcest resources predetermined the persistence of a high level of state intervention in economic processes.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>СССР</kwd><kwd>РСФСР</kwd><kwd>правительство</kwd><kwd>экономическая политика</kwd><kwd>радикальная рыночная реформа</kwd><kwd>Гайдар</kwd><kwd>государственное управление</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>USSR</kwd><kwd>RSFSR</kwd><kwd>government</kwd><kwd>economic policy</kwd><kwd>radical market reform</kwd><kwd>Gaidar</kwd><kwd>public administration</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Глазьев С.Ю. Уроки очередной российской революции. Крах либеральной утопии и шанс на «экономическое чудо». 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