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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">gosupr</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Государственное управление. Электронный вестник</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Public Administration. E-journal (Russia)</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="epub">2070-1381</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Факультет государственного управления МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.24412/2070-1381-2023-96-104-123</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">gosupr-12</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>ПРАВОВЫЕ И ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ АСПЕКТЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Латентное в публичном: изъяны регулирования лоббизма в США</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Latent in Public Mechanisms: Flaws in Lobbying Regulation in the USA</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0438-7957</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Купряшин</surname><given-names>Г. Л.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Kupryashin</surname><given-names>G. L.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Купряшин Геннадий Львович - доктор политических наук, профессор, факультет государственного управления</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Gennady L. Kupryashin - DSc (Political Sciences), Professor, School of Public Administration</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">Kupryashin@spa.msu.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Дробышева</surname><given-names>Е. С.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Drobysheva</surname><given-names>E. S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Дробышева Екатерина Сергеевна - студентка магистратуры, факультет государственного управления</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Ekaterina S. Drobysheva - Master’s degree student</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">DrobyshevaES@spa.msu.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Стародубцев</surname><given-names>A. S.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Starodubtsev</surname><given-names>A. S.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Стародубцев Алексей Сергеевич - cтудент магистратуры, факультет государственного управления</p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Aleksey S. Starodubtsev - Master’s degree student</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">StarodubtsevAS@spa.msu.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова</institution></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Lomonosov Moscow State University</institution></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2023</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>19</day><month>05</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>0</volume><issue>96</issue><fpage>104</fpage><lpage>123</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Купряшин Г.Л., Дробышева Е.С., Стародубцев A.S., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Купряшин Г.Л., Дробышева Е.С., Стародубцев A.S.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Kupryashin G.L., Drobysheva E.S., Starodubtsev A.S.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.spajournal.ru/jour/article/view/12">https://www.spajournal.ru/jour/article/view/12</self-uri><abstract><p>Цель статьи — выявить латентные механизмы лоббизма как публичного института, искажающие цели его государственного регулирования в стране со сложившимися рыночными механизмами и системой государственной поддержки бизнес-процессов. Данное исследование основывается на анализе правовых актов, регулирующих лоббистскую деятельность как на федеральном уровне, так и на уровне штатов и отраслей. В статье показано, что лоббизм как составная часть функционального представительства интересов в США превратился в институт публичного управления с развитой нормативной базой. Однако при детальном анализе механизмов его функционирования, прежде всего на уровне отраслей и штатов, вскрываются практики, влияние которых на государственную политику и управление существенно расходится с легальным целеполаганием. В качестве примера отрасли, где практики теневого лоббирования играют важную роль, приводится здравоохранение, имеющее развитые рыночные механизмы в сочетании с продвинутой системой государственной поддержки и регулирования. Кроме того, установлено, что лоббирование даже при развитом его нормативном регулировании существенно искажает «свободную политическую конкуренцию», когда его практики ведут к воспроизводству ветократии, а также включает такие политико-административные механизмы, как астротурфинг (astroturf) и лоббирование за счет налогоплательщиков (taxpayer-funded lobbying). Особенно хорошо это видно на уровне штатов. Выделены особенности регулирования лоббирования, влияющие на социально-экономическое развитие региона и его инвестиционную привлекательность.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The aim of the article is to identify the contradictory impact of lobbying as a public institution on public policy and administration at the sectoral and regional levels of a country with established market mechanisms and a system of state support. This study is based on an analysis of legal acts regulating lobbying activities both at the federal level and at the level of states and industries. The article shows that lobbying as an integral part of the functional representation of interests in the United States has turned into an institution of public administration with a developed regulatory framework. However, when analyzing in detail the mechanisms of its functioning at the level of industries and states, practices are revealed whose influence on public policy and administration significantly diverges from legal goal-setting. An example of an industry where lobbying practices play an important role is healthcare, which has developed market mechanisms combined with an advanced system of state support and regulation. In addition, it has been established that lobbying, even with its developed normative regulation, significantly distorts free political competition, when its practices lead to the reproduction of vetocracy, and also includes such political and administrative mechanisms as astroturf and taxpayer-funded lobbying. This is especially evident at the state level. The features of lobbying regulation that affect the socio-economic development of the region and its investment attractiveness are highlighted.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>лоббирование</kwd><kwd>механизмы лоббирования</kwd><kwd>государственное регулирование</kwd><kwd>ветократия</kwd><kwd>астротурфинг</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>lobbying</kwd><kwd>lobbying mechanisms</kwd><kwd>state regulation</kwd><kwd>vetocracy</kwd><kwd>astroturf</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Белоусов А.Б. Современная практика лоббизма в США // Антиномии. 2013. № 2. С. 69–86.</mixed-citation><mixed-citation xml:lang="en">Belousov A.B. (2013) Contemporary Practice of Lobbying in USA. Antinomii. No. 2. 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